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ABSTRACT
Information Theory is applicable to a number of fields
o
The basic statistic of Information Theory, - y p. log p , Ls
/
derived for the discrete case using Bayes's rule for the
probability of causes . Various properties of this function
are derived and discussed.
The writer wishes to express his appreciation for the
assistance and encouragement given him by Professor
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In 1948 Claude Shannon published his now famous paper
entitled "The Mathematical Theory of Communication" 11 ,
later reprinted with a paper by Warren Weaver as reference
I
12 i in which he defined a communication system as being
composed of an information source,, a transmitter, a channel,
a receiver, and the destination. The fundamental problem in
such a system is the reproduction at the destination either
exactly or approximately a message selected at the informa-
tion source, His approach was statistical in nature, that is,
he did not consider the semantic aspects of the message but
rather that the message is one of a set of possible messages .
Among other things he showed that under certain conditions it
is possible to encode the transmitted information so that it
would be received with an arbitrarly small frequency of error
Basic to his arguments is a concept known in thermody-
namics as entropy, which can be described as a measure of the
amount of disorder in a physical system. This implies that a
message, in some sense, represents a certain amount of dis-
order and that there is a measure of this disorder which can
be obtained and used.
Kullbach 7 recently published a book in which he
uses the same basic concept to provide a unifying background
for the study of the testing of statistical hypotheses ,

Bagno 1 uses Shannon's theorems to arrive at some start-
ling conclusions relative to economic theory. Miller's 9
article presents a short discussion on the use of these con-
cepts in the field of psychology. Thus Information Theory
apparently has a wide field of applications.
What is information? One dictionary lists among its
several definitions " . „ . knowledge communicated or received
concerning some fact . ,o". We say that knowledge is certain-
ty and that Information Theory is the study of the ability of
systems to transmit certainty or equivalently , of the change
in an observer's state of uncertainty when he has performed
experiments on a situation and drawn conclusions (gained
knowledge) from the results ,
In the following pages we will develop the basic sta-
tistic of Information Theory and show that it is a logical
and appealing measure of information in the above sense . The
basis of the development will be Probability Theory and
specifically an application of Bayes's rule.
1
The New Century Dictionary, Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1948

2 . Bayes Rule and Information
Let us perform a simple experiment and see if there is
a pattern or characteristic which can be exploited to obtain
a statistic which relates a situation prior to one or more
observations to the situation after the observations,,
We can represent the situation by A, where A is composed
of m mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, a,,a„,o„.,a ;12 m
the outcomes of an observation by B e where B is composed of n
mutually exclusive and exhaustive events b, ,b„, .«o,b «> An12 n
event a. occurs with probability p(a.) , < p(a.)<[ 1
/ p(a )=1; an event b occurs with probability p(b.) ,
*^-> i i J
0<T p(b.) < 1, ) p(b.)=l„
— J *— J
J
Consider that we have been given two nickels, told that
one is fair and the other biased so the probability of heads
appearing when tossed is \ t and asked to determine which is
the fair nickel „ Let the experiment consist of choosing one
of the two nickels at random, tossing it twice and noting
the outcome of both tosses . Based on the results of this
experiment we are to state the probability that the chosen
nickel is fair
„
Let a denote the event: the fair nickel is chosen, and
a denotes the event: the biased nickel is chosen . Let b
denote the event: the nickel comes up heads, and b denote
the event: the nickel comes up tails.

Since we make a random choice , the probability that the
fair nickel is chosen,, p(a ) , is equal to \ t and the proba-
bility that the biased nickel is chosen, p( a 7 ) is also equal
to h.
The conditional probability of a specific outcome will






















Considering now the first toss of the coin, from the
definition of conditional probability we can write
p(a„b.) = p(b./a.) p(a.) (1)
i j J i i
where a b denotes the joint occurrence of event* a, and out-
i j i




P(b.) = Yp(b./a.) p(a.) . (2)
J ^t-' J 1 1
/
The conditional probability of event a. is the ratio of the
probability of the joint occurrence of both events to the
probability of the outcome, or in symbols.
1
W, Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Ap-





i j p(b ) (3)













which is Bayes's rule for the probability of causes if we
identify the event a. with the cause and outcome b. with the
effect
.
Using the given values we can calculate the conditional
probability of a
.
„ which in the context of Bayes's rule is
known as the aposteriori probability of event a , as con-
trasted with p(a.) , the apr lori probability of event a.
.











Thus after one toss of the nickel, the aposteriori probabil-
ity of having chosen the fair nickel is 2/3 if we had ob-
served heads, and 2/5 if we had observed tails <, If the se-
quence, selection and toss, was repeated a large number of
times, the aposteriori probabilities represent the frequency
loc . cit ,

with which the observer would be correct if. he associated a
given choice with a given outcome .
We will now toss the coin for the second time c Defining
the joint outcome b .b, „ j ,k = 1,2, as the pair of observations
j k
made in the two tosses, we can extend (4) to
p(b.b,/a.) p(a.)
p(a Tbb ) J K 1 . (6)
1 J K rP (b.b/a,) p(a.)
^ j k x i
/
The conditional probability of the outcome of a single toss
remains the same once a coin is chosen, therefore
p(b /a.) = p(b./a.) for j = k, (7)
jc i 3
Since the tosses are independent,
p(b b /a.) = p(b./a.) p(b /a.) , (8)
J JC X 1 JC X
Substituting (8) into (6)
,
p(b./a ) p(b /a.) p(a.)
j i k i
'i jk ; -yp(bVaJ ptt^/aj p(aj
We are now in a position to calculate the aposteriori prob-
ability of event a, after two observations „ Again using the







1 1 4/5 1/5
1 2 4/7 3/7
2 1 4/7 3/7
2 2 4/13 9/13
(10)
Thus if after two tosses we had observed heads-heads,, the
aposteriori probability that the coin is fair would be 4/5.
Notice that for each additional toss the size of the
table required to describe the possible outcomes is doubled,
If instead of this almost trivial example we had set m and n
equal to 50, the table required to describe the situation
would be enormous. It would be desirable to have a simpler
way of presenting this data.
The denominator in (9) can be written in a manner anal-
ogous to (2) as p (b .b ) . Multiplying (9) by
J k
I p (b ./a. ) p (a.
)
/ 1 i i and rearranging
I
p(b./a.) p(a.)
p(a./b b ) =
l j k
























Notice that the expression for the aposteriori probability
of event a after the first observation
,
(4) , appears on the
i
right side of (11) and is multiplied by a fraction whose val-
ue is determined by the outcome of the second observation.
Thus we can say that the aposteriori probability of event
a. after the first observation becomes the apriori proba-
bility of event a. before the second observation. If we rep-
resent the fraction — ._ , .—*— in (12) by F_, and thep(b
i V ) 2
P(b./a.) J *
fraction
— j . in (3) and (12) by F , we can write (3) as
p(a./b.) = F p(a.) (13)
i j l i
and (12) as
p (aAV F i p 2 »<V (14)
It is apparent that this could be extended to any number of
observations. The aposteriori. probability after say n ob-
servations is the product of n F factors and the apriori prob-
ability for the first observation. This then is the pattern
which we will use
„
We will define information as a statistic which meas-
ures the change in an observers belief as to which event a.,
i
from a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events A, is
the cause of outcome b . from a mutually exclusive and ex-
J
haustive set of outcomes B, where Vp(a) = 1, ) p(b.) = 1,
and <: p(a. ) , p (b .) <I 1. We require the following mathe-
8

matical properties of this statistic: a „ additivity, and
b. dependence on apriori and aposteriori probabilities. Ad-
ditivity requires that the total amount of information ob-
tained from a sequence of observations is the sum of the a-
mounts obtained from the individual observations .
The F. defined above do relate to apriori and aposte-
riori probabilities The requirement of additivity can be
met by use of the function log F for
log (F F „o.F ) = log(Fj + log(Fj + . .= + log (F ) . (15)
1 I n 1 2 n
Shannon 11, 12 uses base two logarithms, defining the
unit of information as a bit
,
a contraction of binary digit.
One bit of information corresponds to being informed of the
outcome of a binary equally likely selection, a unit which
is convenient since a relay or flip flop circuit can store
one bit of information. Kullback 7 uses natural loga-
rithms since his work involves integration and differenti-
ation and others have used base 10 .

3 . Uncertainty
We have indicated that a measure of the total change in
belief of an observer is the sum of the logarithms of the F
factors . Let us now look at the information obtained from
the first observation of a sequence designated as I .
i j







n ]y, s * (16)a .b
. p (b J
i J J



















1 j i j
Confining our attention to (17) for the moment, if p(a./b.)is
greater than p(a.) , the information is positive; if less
than p(a.) , the information is negative. Positive informa-
tion corresponds to an increase in certainty. If p(a./b.)
-1
- J
was equal to one, we would be certain that a. was the cause
1
of our observed outcome . We will define the uncertainty of
event a. as the value of I , when p (a /b.) = 1, thus the
1 a.b . i j
1 J
uncertainty of event a . is - log p(a.) . This is the maximum
amount of information which can be obtained concerning a in
1
one observation We are more concerned however with the en-
tire set A so let us first obtain the average uncertainty
10







H (A) is descriptive of set A or of any other set with the
same number of events and the same probability distribution.
We can also speak of the average uncertainty of observation
set B, and the event-outcome pair set AB as
H(B) = -Yp(b ) log p(b.K (20)
and
H(AB)=-VyP (a,b.) log p(a.b,). (21)
' J
Consider now the average information obtained on a par-
ticular event. a. e if we average over all possible outcomes






^ P(b /a )
= )p(b./a.) log —
—}—f . (22)Lr j i p(b.)
J
x
This average is obviously equal to zero when p (b /a )
J i
is equal to p(b.) ; recalling from (2) that p(b.) is equal to
\ p (h ./a .) p(a ) ;, we see that this is only possible when
/
p(a.) is equal to unity, or when all the p (b /a ) are equali j i
for a given i» In the first case we would obtain no informa-
tion since a. is the only event which can occur, and in the




pendent of a . . We will show that in all other cases I -
1 a . B
i 1
is greater than zero.. An inequality from Feinstein 4 can
be written as
Vq. log p, <; Yq, log q. (2 3)
/ . 1 JL, t 1 -Li
/ /
for 0<q_. , p . < 1 , \ p. =1, ^q. =1, i = 1 , 2, ...,»n, with
/ /








and identifying p(b./a.) with q. , p(b.) with p., we see thatji i j i
the second term on the right is always less than or equal to
the first term. Now since the logarithms of numbers less
than one are negative, the difference is always greater than
or equal to zero Therefore the average information from
one observation on a single event is a positive quantity
corresponding to a decrease in uncertainty, or is zero cor-
responding to no change . Thus
I R > (25)a j3
i 1
We will now show that the average information obtained
from a sequence of observations on the same event cannot ex-













I n =) p(b /a.) p(b./a.) log —7 ]-—
.
(27)
a B L-LS k i 1 p(a./b )
i 2 j K 1. j
By an argument identical to that used to prove (25) this
average is also greater than or equal to zero. Separating
the logarithms in I
_.
and I we can write the sum as
a B a.B^
1 1 12
I „ + I n = Y"p(b./a.) log p(a./b.) -Yp(b./a.) log p(a.)
1 1 1 2 j J
+ yVp(b/a.) p(b./a.) logp(a./b.b)
J K
-VYp^/a.) p(b./a.) log p(a./b.) = (28)
J K
If we now sum the last term on the right over k, we see that
the result is identical to the first term, thus both terms
cancel out, leaving us
VB + Ia.B
o
- LLP{\/a i ] P(Va i } ^ P^i^jVil 1 2 j K
-VpQD./aJ log p(a.) . (29)
J
Similarly f in a sequence of say n observations, the first
term in the expression for the average information from one
observation in the sequence will cancel out with the second
term in the expression for the average information from the
next observation in the sequence. The sum will therefore
consist of two terms such as
Yl
= n = YY Vp(b b .b /a.) log p(a,/b.b . . .b )i—* a.B £_.£_ .., £__ jk mi ilk m
r=i x r J K *"




where b is the first outcome and b the last outcome. Now
the maximum value which the first term on the right can at-
tain is zero, corresponding to p(a./b.b . „ „b ) = 1, and the
i j k m
second term is just the uncertainty of event a. . Thus
max
i r
Da B = - log P (\>- (31)
Returning to the case of a single observation, let us
average I over all events a and see what the overall
a ,B, i
l 1
average, that is,, over both events and outcomes, looks like
By (18) we can write (22) as
p(a b.)
I = \p(b./a ) log . \ ] .. . . (32)
a B /f i L " p(a_.) p(b.)
r—
•
i i) . '
i. L.. 1 l * a )ix i j







\ = ZW L p{h/\ ] log puTTTb.) ( 33)
/ j L J







log P^ a i
b) " lo(3 P( a
±
)
~ lo(3 P (*>•)] -(34)
' J
By (19) , (20) and (21) we see that
I = -H(AB) + H(A) + H(B) . (35)
Since we have established that I is nonnegative, I must
a . B 1
i
also be nonnegative . This implies that
H(AB) < H(A) + H(B)
, (36)
with equality when A and B are independent, or one or both
consist of one event with probability one . We can also write
14

133) in the form
T = )p<a ) ) p(b./a ) log p (b . /a . ) -)p (b ./a . ) log p (b .
1 L i fc- J J J i 4- J i J
/ LJ J
. (37)
The fLrst term inside the brackets is similar in form to
(19) , (20) and (21) and we will define the uncertainty of
outcome set B. given a specific event a. as
H(B/a.) = -Yp(b./a.) log p(b./a.) , (38)
J






) H(B/a i ) + ££p( a ib ) lo9 P(b ) • ( 39 )
/ ' J
Now the first term on the right is the average conditional
uncertainty of B and the second term is the uncertainty of B,
thus, denoting the average conditional uncertainty by H (B/A)
,
I = -H(B/A) + H(B) (40)
Since I is nonnegative,
H (B/A) < H (B)
,
with equality as in (36) .
(41)
(16) and (17) are symmetric expressions in a. and b,, so
an equivalent averaging of (17) would yield
I = -H(A/B) + H(A) (42)
and
H(A/B) < H(A) (43)
15

4o Properties of the Uncertainty Statistic
A number of properties were obtained in the previous
section namely:
H(AB) < H(A) + H(B) (36)
H(B/A) < H(B) (41)
and H(A/B) < H (A) . (43)
We will now consider this function in its own right and
obtam some additional properties , Subtracting (40) from (35)
we find that
H(AB) = H(A) + H(B/A), (44)
and subtracting (42) from (35)
,
H(AB) = H(B) + H(A/B) . (45)
Since H is of the form — Yp. log p. we may represent it
/
as H(p
, p., ..., p ) By the property of the logarithm,12 m
lim x log x = 0,
x-»0
H(p. f P 9 , ...i p.0) = H(p , p , ..., p ), (46)12 m 12 m
which indicates that adding an impossible event to a set does
not change the average uncertainty.
Let us now determine the probability distribution for
which the H function takes on its maximum value . Using the
1
method of Lagrange multipliers and writing H as a function
of all its arguments, we form




W = H(P]/ p2 , .... pm ) + A[&i " X] ' (47)
/
or
W = - I> t log p i
+ A [!>! - i ] (48 >
Taking partial derivitives of W with respect to p.,
_&___ w =~ p „ log p - log p . + X for i = 1 , 2, . .m . (49)
v In i i
OP. op.
>
Setting this equal to zero to obtain the extreme point and
solving for log p .
,
log p = \ - 1, (50)
p = exp ( X ~ 1) • (51)
Summing both sides of (51) on i and solving for exp ( X ~ 1) >
exp ( X - 1) = 1/m, (52)
Substituting (52) into (51)
,
p. = 1/m. (53)
Thus the probability distribution for which the average un-
certainty is the maximum is the uniform distribution, or
H(p.., p , ...,P ) < H(l/m, 1/m,..., 1/m) (54)1 z m
with equality when p. = 1/m
„
If we have two sets, one with m events, the other with
m + 1 events, the maximum average uncertainty of the smaller
set is less than the maximum average uncertainty of the
larger one . This can be seen by computing and noting the
right side of (54) for both cases ,









m+l m+1' ' * ' m+1 ) (56)
Consider the form of H when one event say m, is composed






, p , .. Pm , q , q ) = Yp. log p + Yq log q1 2 m-1 1 2 {__ l 1 £_j l (57)
and
H(p . P , ... p ) = Vp, log p. + p log p
1 ^ m £_, i ini m (58)
Subtracting (57) from (56) and combining the logarithms of
the terms on the extreme right.
H(p. , P_, ... p ., q., qj «« H(p , p » . .., p ) + p H
i 2 ro-1 12 12 mm P P
m m
(59)
We had previously stated that H was descriptive of its
set of arguments but not that it was unique. Shannon 11, 12
shows that the only function continuous in p. and possessing
properties (56) and (59) is - A) P- 1°9" P. » where A i s an
arbitrary constant, Khinchin
j
6 shows the same result
using properties (44) , (46) and (54) .
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